

DRAFT  
WHY WE NEED A  
MILITARY IN A POST-CONTAINMENT ERA  
FOR USCG ACADEMY 9 Feb 1973

Why am I here?

Changes at NWC

At about same time local TV highlighted your course in  
"Mixology"

- Naval War College tries to broaden horizons of its students, but hasn't gone quite that far.

One of the programs NWC DOES have is that of inviting distinguished foreign military figures to speak.

Several months ago late VADM M. B. Maas

(Remarks on Personality)

- Stated that when Sukarno came to power in Indonesia, Dutch Navy lost its primary mission.
- Was forced to reorient - Find new reason for existence.
- US Navy - Entire US military may be in similar position.

For past twenty-five years military policy premised on the necessity for suppressing the expansion of monolithic communism.

No longer valid and no longer will sell at home or abroad.

Detente now everywhere

VN ceasefire

SALT

MBFR

China & USSR visits - economic trade with both  
Common Market

East/West German moves

Leads many people to ask why have need a strong U.S. military  
in the 1970's-1980's?

Places you and me in difficult position. For all of my career, it has been accepted that being in uniform in the Service of your country was honorable, patriotic thing. For all of this time it was assumed that strong military forces were a necessary element of our way of life—there were arguments over how much and what kind of Navy, Coast Guard, Army, Air Force were needed but the underlying presumption was that military strength was a foundation of our place in the world. Today you and I must not only be able to perform our assigned functions well, we must be able to articulate why our services are needed by the U.S. of the 1970's. What are you doing to get ready for that? Are you as Coast Guard officers going to justify your role solely on the many and increasingly important protective and humanitarian functions that occupy most of your professional time. Or are you going to face squarely the fact that you are inextricably part of our uniformed military establishment. It used to be that you came into the Navy only on declaration of war—but recently we called on you for combat operations off the coast of Vietnam and you responded beautifully. Are you prepared to

defend this role that your seniors have just completed and like roles that may engage you before too long?

Sure you would agree with me not really difficult to know why we are going to continue to need a strong military.

- Obvious cannot abruptly abandon 25 years of responsibilities we have shouldered around the world in large countries and small.
- Military power and world status are synonymous. U.S. is and wants to be a world power.
- Obvious despite enthusiasm and optimism, problems will arise - Hobbes -
- Obvious no evidence ideology and objectives of Soviet Union and China have changed; whether the contemporary practice of detente will have any permanent impact remains to be seen. (Von Ribbentrop? Rapallo?)

Convincing? Will this sell to your contemporaries in civilian life? Will they ask?

- Hasn't the world in which we could or should be the world's policeman changed? The expense of "Patrolling the beat" has become unbearable-especially with the soaring costs of today's weapons.
- Hasn't increased awareness of extent domestic problems lessened national interest in solving the problems of others?

Example

- Hasn't armament building historically proven to be a spiraling competition that ends on conflagration? Someone must start to reverse the trend. The opportunity is ripe.
- Hasn't Vietnam proved that our national interests do not require sacrifices of that order.
- Isn't war intrinsically bad/immoral even if peace is not "Normal" or "Usual"?

If these views have merit, how do we make an argument to dissuade the older generation from their traditional opinions. Or perhaps the problem is vice versa. Or where in between?

- It is much like the case of dealing with an evowed pacifist. Each pacifist's denial of the use of violence is somewhat different.
  - Some object only to immoral wars.
  - Some object only to wars overseas, but would take up arms if the United States were invaded.
  - Some would take up arms if the United States were invaded only if assured we had not provoked the attack.
  - Some would wait until his own home was sequestered.  
(Quartering of soldiers)
  - Some would take up violence only if the occupying soldier had attempted to rape his sister.

- Some would only strike a blow to save his own life.
- Few would eschew violence totally.

Just as most pacifists actions be between the extremes of total eschewal of violence and naked aggressiveness, so the mission of today's military lies between two extremes. One is exclusive reliance for security on military strength. The other is reliance only on good will and detente. At one extreme we support intervention at any dimly perceived threat of a communist take over anywhere in the world. On the other we accept total isolationism. As a pacifist, we are bound to end up somewhere in between. Where?

- As a start, let's bound the problem on the side of the most probable use of United States military forces for which there would be national approval-consensus-This it seems to me is an overt, precipitous, unprovoked, unambiguous Warsaw Pact invasion of western Europe. Few would deny that the absorption of Western Europe into the Soviet orbit would be inimical to our national interests. There, of course, could be dispute on how much peacetime military force we should afford for the purpose of preventing the overrunning of Europe. That's the same issue as how much fire insurance you take out on your house. We know that we want some insurance, but how much varies with our income, the condition

of our house and our general outlook on the future.

But even if we agree on some level of assurance against a major war for Western Europe, where else do we look past this extreme?

What would our reaction be to a piecemeal, more subtle Soviet approach to absorbing Western Europe? For instance, a minor military action to take possession of a portion of the northern "flank" of Norway or easternmost flank of Turkey. Would we view this as so inimical to the credibility and adhesion of the NATO alliance that we would go to war because the end result would be the same as an invasion of Europe. Or would we view this as a Sudetenland issue where a compromise or concession by us would bring "peace in our time"?

A direct military grab may be too overt. What if Soviet's made their naval power appear so menacing to Norway, or Yugoslavia, or Iceland, or Turkey, that these nations believed that they could be supported by allied sea power in an emergency? If those states were about to enter the Soviet Bloc by default would we want to be able to counter the impression of Soviet naval dominance in the area?

Where would we draw the line in the Pacific? What if Soviet Maritime encirclement of China (with or without cooperation from Japan) left China so exposed that she was forced into an accommodation with the Soviet Union? Think of the impact this could have on the European scene—without China menacingly at her back, the Soviets could free sufficient resources to apply greater pressure on western Europe than she can possibly afford today.

- Already our commercial trade in the Pacific basin is almost equal to that in the European. Would we be willing to see minor Soviet or Chinese-inspired military actions chip away at our access to these markets? Perhaps a counter-coup in Indonesia, subversion in the Philippines.

In the Middle East would we stand by Israel if her existence were threatened?

In the Mid-east also do we not need to consider that by 1980 perhaps 40 to 50 percent of our oil energy will be imported from that area, if there are not major changes of current policies. (and they must be changed very rapidly to affect 1980) Would we tolerate to see military actions, blockades, or embargoes that would jeopardize this flow? How much pressure do we want to be vulnerable to if we cannot prevent interference with this energy artery?

Aren't there numerous other potential situations visible even today in which it is imaginable that breakdowns in world stability could possibly endanger U.S. interests? (e.g., the Yugoslavia succession, Soviet-inspired Cuban meddling in the Western hemisphere, or even severe economic competition with Japan or the Common Market. After all, we are talking about not only the tolerance level for employing military forces in combat, but their use as instruments of national influence. The military support and shield we provide for Japan, for instance, is one of form of insurance against too strong an economic position. Our military guarantee in Europe is perhaps our greatest claim to any influence in European affairs now those countries are economically and politically strong.

Finally, we cannot overlook our potential for relying on military forces to deter the outbreak of conflict simply by their presence and implied capability. They provide the President one, among numerous, methods of signalling his intent. Yet, one should not (and cannot) use military power to deter without a willingness and capability to employ it.

There are those who would argue that any brandishing of military force is bad. No issue worthy only of brandishing is vital to U.S. interests and brandishing may be only the



precursor to use. There are those who would say that most of the situations I have hypothesized as potentials for employment of military force are not concerned with U.S. vital interests either. They are not concerned if Soviet interference in Yugoslavia, for instance, should tip the fine balances in Eastern Europe and impact on the Middle East. They would never feel concerned at events in small countries like Viet Nam or even our Latin American neighbors. And well they may be right.

To return, though, to my analogy with the individual pacifist, what I am suggesting is that somewhere between fighting another Vietnam and defending Western Europe against a major invasion, there may be a threshold point for U.S. military involvement. How large and what kind of a military establishment we require today is in large part a function of where our intuition tells us that threshold will lie 5-10 years from now.

We have been talking about the tolerance level, the threshold, for actually employing military force. In practice, there likely would be more instances of relying on the existence of our forces to deter the outbreak of combat rather than actually employing them. However, one should not (and cannot) use military power to deter without a willingness and capability to employ it.

Thus, the case for having military force in the 1970's and 1980's rests on the uncertainty of events that could impact on U.S. national interests. The risk in not having enough military force available lies in the possibility of suddenly being confronted by some interference with our interests which we cannot prevent because our forces are inadequate, e.g.,

- Persian Gulf oil
- Fishing rights
- Mineral imports

But there are risks in having too much insurance also. The obvious one is cost—the lost opportunities to spend on other programs or to reduce taxes.

With military insurance, there some also see a risk that our having military force will lead to its use, both because of our past habit of reliance on it, and because of pressures from within the military establishment. There is a thin barrier between brandishing a sword and striking with it.

The answer to the first objection on costs lies in a judicious balance in our allocation of resources. I for one do not believe that this need be a major problem. We are by far the wealthiest nation in the world. We can afford what we need for military defense and for domestic

well being. We need to sort out our sense of priorities as a nation. We in uniform must help in doing this by being explicit in stating what levels of military force can do what for the country. If we overestimate or think exclusively of goals that the country has rejected, we will not help the process of resolving priorities. I am confident, though, that the people of our country do recognize that our responsibilities call for a strong military capability and will support guns and butter too in reasonable proportion.

The answer to the second risk that comes with military insurance—the unnecessary use of military force because you have it—lies in firm civilian command of all national assets—military and non-military. If, as some believe, we have relied too heavily on military power in the past several decades, the answer is to learn better how to employ our economic, diplomatic, psychological and other national assets. Premptorily eliminating the bass drums is not the best way to prevent their dominating the orchestra. The proper orchestration for the United States in the next decade may call for a lesser military element, but let us not tie the President's hands by denying him any option of choice. Surely we can be rational enough as a nation not to call out the military unnecessarily without eliminating

our insurance policy entirely. There are simply too many uncertainties ahead.

Within this broad framework, I see the roles for both our Navy and our Coast Guard expanding over the next decade. As this winter's fuel crisis brought painfully close to home, our own nation is becoming increasingly reliant on overseas sources for oil. Other minerals essential to industry must also be imported. As the Soviet Navy increasingly makes its presence felt throughout the ocean's of the world, we must be prepared to defend this trade.

Beyond this, the role of the sea in our daily life is expanding exponentially. Man will tap the many economic and recreational resources of the oceans to a dramatic new degree in the years ahead. There are fewer laws and precedents to govern this development than on land. This is where we both come in, primarily you in the Coast Guard. Much of the responsibility for regulating, policing and ensuring the safety of our new reliance on the sea will be yours, but always backed by the implicit fighting strength of our total naval power, the United States Navy and when needed the United States Coast Guard. Together we have great challenges ahead and great opportunities for service to our country.

WITHIN THIS BROAD FRAMEWORK I SEE THE ROLES FOR OUR COAST GUARD EXPANDING OVER THE NEXT DECADE.

- AS OIL IMPORTATION INCREASES THE COAST GUARD ROLE IN POLLUTION CONTROL BECOMES MORE CRUCIAL.
- CONSTRUCTION OF SUPER TANKERS AND OTHER SEAGOING BEHEMOTHS REQUIRES EVEN MORE STRINGENT INSPECTIONS PRIOR TO SAFETY CERTIFICATION.
- AS OUR ECONOMY SHIFTS EVEN MORE FROM BULLETS TO BUTTER THE AMERICAN WILL FIND MORE LEISURE TIME WHICH WILL RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN PLEASURE BOATING AND THE COAST GUARD'S HUMANITARIAN MISSION.

THUS AS THE UNITED STATES LICKS ITS WOUNDS AFTER A WAR EXPENSIVE BOTH IN LIVES AND MONEY, A SERVICE WHICH ANNUALLY RESPONDS TO 40,000 CALLS FOR HELP, SAVES 3,000 LIVES AND RENDERS ASSISTANCE TO 2 BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF SHIPPING, FINDS ITSELF A SECURE FUTURE.

WHY WE NEED A  
MILITARY IN A POST-CONTAINMENT  
ERA  
FOR USCG ACADEMY  
9-Feb-1973

Why am I here?

Your Sup't Honored Guest at our USMC Ball

- Drowned out by Marines
- Your Band had last word with CG March
- Maybe this is Admiral Thompson's Revenge

*changes at NWC*

At about same time local TV highlighted your Course  
in "Mixology"

- Naval War College tries to broaden horizons  
of its students, but hasn't gone quite that far.

One of the Programs NWC DOES have is that of inviting  
Distinguished Foreign Mil figures to speak.

Several months ago late VADM John M.B. Maas

(Remarks on Personality)

- Stated that when Sukarno came to power in  
Indonesia, Dutch Navy lost its primary mission.
- Was forced to reorient - Find new reason for  
existence.
- US Navy - Entire US Military may be in similar  
position.

Places you & me in difficult position. For all of my career, it has been accepted that being in uniform in the service of your country was honorable, patriotic thing. For all of this time it was assumed that strong military forces were a necessary element of our way of life - this were arguments over how much & what kind of Navy, Coast Guard, Army, <sup>Air Force was needed</sup> etc. But the underlying presumption was that military strength was a foundation of our place in the world. Today you & I must not only be

A 2

to perform our assigned functions well, we must be able to articulate why our services are needed by the U.S. of the 1970's. What are you <sup>bringing</sup> ~~ready~~ ~~to~~ that? Are you as your C.G. officers going to ~~solely~~ justify your role solely on the many & increasingly important protective & humanitarian roles functions that that occupy most of your professional time. Or are you going to face squarely the fact that you are an ~~integral~~ ~~integral~~ part of our ~~unreformed~~ ~~unreformed~~ military establishment. It ~~isn't~~ ~~isn't~~ to be that you came into ~~the~~



A-3

Now only on declaration I am -  
But recently we called on you  
for combat operations off the coast  
of Vietnam, & you responded  
beautifully. Are you prepared  
to defend this role that your  
seniors have just completed &  
like roles that ~~you~~ may engage  
you before long?

For past twenty five years military policy premised on the necessity for suppressing the expansion of monolithic communism. No longer valid and no longer will sell at home or abroad.

Detente now everywhere |

VN Ceasefire

SALT

MBFR

*USSR*  
China visits and Economics moves *talk with both*

Common Market

East/West German moves

(A) Leads many people to ask why have <sup>just</sup> a strong military in the 1970's-1980's? <sup>us.</sup>

*sure you would agree with me not different / to know why <sup>we are</sup> going to continue to need a strong military*

Don't wish to seem an "ORACLE" but it should be clear why we need military forces, despite the apparent eclipse of monolithic communism.

- Obvious* • Cannot abruptly abandon 25 years of responsibilities. *we have shouldered around the world in large countries & small.*
- Obvious* • Military Power and world status are synonymous. *U.S. is & wants to be a world power*
- Obvious* • Despite enthusiasm and optimism, problems will arise. - *Albles* -

*Observer*  
*of China*  
• No evidence ideology and objectives of Soviet Union have changed; whether the contemporary practice of detente will have any permanent impact remains to be seen.

(Von Ribbentrop? Rapallo?)

Convincing? Will this sell to your contemporaries in civilian life? *Will they ask?*

• Hasn't the world in which we could or should be the world's policeman changed? *The* expense of "patrolling the beat" has become unbearable. *especially with the soaring costs of today's weapons.*

• Hasn't increased awareness of domestic problems lessened national interest in *solving* the problems of others?

*impl*  
• Hasn't armament building historically proven to be a spiraling competition that ends in conflagration? Someone must start to reverse the trend. The opportunity is ripe.

• Hasn't Vietnam proved that our national interests do not require sacrifices of that order. (*Hindsight? - Seemed to require at the time*)

• Isn't war intrinsically bad/immoral even if peace is not "Normal" or "Usual"?

If these views have merit, how do we make an argument to dissuade the older generation from their traditional opinions. Or perhaps the problem is vice versa. *Or where is the line?*

• It is much like the case of dealing with an avowed pacifist. Each pacifist's denial of the use of violence is somewhat different.

- Some object only to "immoral" wars.
- Some object only to wars overseas, but would take up arms if the United States were invaded.
- Some would take up arms if the United States were invaded only if assured we had not provoked the attack.
- Some would wait until his own home was sequestered. (Quartering of soldiers)
- Some would take up violence only if the occupying soldier had attempted to rape his sister.
- Some would only strike a blow to save his own life.
- Few would eschew violence totally.

The current trend to eschew violence is not unique. I recommend to you Herman Wouk's *new book* The Winds of War. It so aptly portrays the mood of the nation in the late 30's and early 40's - better perhaps than any non-fiction. What would have happened if the Japanese had not struck at Pearl Harbor - a precipitous move close to home? *?*

~~Would the country have mobilized behind the~~

~~war effort?~~

*Just as most governments have been + the threat of total internal violence & hatred aggression, etc.*  
The mission of today's military lies between two extremes.

*One is exclusive reliance on military strength for security. The other is reliance only on good will & deterrence.*  
The nation will not and should not support intervention at *At one extreme we*

any dimly perceived threat of a communist take over anywhere

*On the other hand* in the world. ~~Nor do I believe will it accept total~~

isolationism.

*As a pacifist, we are bound to end up somewhere in between. Where?*

- As a start, let's bound the problem on the

side of most probable concurrence in the use of United States

*for which there would be national approval - consensus -*  
military forces *an overt, precipitous, unprovoked, un-*

ambiguous Warsaw Pact invasion of western Europe. Few would

deny that the absorption of Western Europe into Soviet *the*

~~Russia~~ would be inimical to our national interests. There,

of course, could be dispute on how much peacetime military

force we should afford for the purpose of preventing the

*That's the same issue as how much force is necessary for the*  
overrunning of Europe. [If we maintain a considerable military

force solely to combat this improbable event, there are those

who argue that any other mission can be adequately met thereby.

Before we accept this "lesser included case" assumption, we

should examine some other potential thresholds for the use

of military force.]

(B)

But even if we agree on some  
level of assurance against a  
major war for Western Europe, when  
else do we look past this extreme?

*Secret*  
What would our reaction be to a piecemeal, more subtle

approach to absorbing Western Europe? For instance, a <sup>minor</sup> direct military grab <sup>action to take possession</sup> of a portion of one of the <sup>northern</sup> "flank" nations, e.g., northern Norway or easternmost Turkey. (2)

Would this be viewed <sup>this</sup> as a Sudetenland issue where a <sup>concession</sup> con-

cession by us would bring "peace in our time"? Would it <sup>be</sup> be viewed <sup>this is a</sup> as the first step in <sup>so unusual to</sup> reducing the credibility and

adhesion of the NATO alliance and thereby lead inevitably <sup>that we would go to war because</sup> to the same end result as an invasion of Europe? <sup>the end result would be the same as an invasion of Europe. Or would we</sup>

A direct military grab may be too overt. What if <sup>menacing</sup> Soviet <sup>naval</sup> power appeared so great to Norway, or Yugoslavia, or Iceland, or any <sup>Turkey</sup> of the Coastal mid-east nations, that some nation believed its <sup>the taking could</sup> causes were not supportable by allied sea power. If that state's perception of isolation <sup>in an emergency?</sup> became so great that it entered the Soviet Bloc by default <sup>were about to</sup> <sup>these</sup> <sup>would be</sup>

Where would we draw the line in the Pacific? What if Soviet Maritime encirclement of China (with or without

cooperation from Japan) left China so exposed that she was forced into an accommodation with the Soviet Union? Would <sup>the key to</sup>

*the Soviets could* <sup>impact this could have on the European scene - without China menacingly at her back,</sup> this not free sufficient Soviet resources to apply greater <sup>possibly</sup> pressure on western Europe than she can afford today.

~~with China at her back.~~

(C)

we are talking about not only  
the tolerance level for employing  
military forces in combat, but  
their use as instruments of  
national influence. Our military  
support, <sup>should we provide</sup> for Japan, for  
instance, is one of the basis of  
form of insurance against the  
loss of an economic position. Our  
military guarantee in Europe is  
perhaps our most greatest claim to  
any influence in European affairs now.  
Those countries are economically &  
strong & politically strong. &  
Finally we cannot overlook  
the general use of military force.



C-1

our ~~the~~ potential for relying on military forces to deter the outbreak of conflict simply by their presence & implied capability. They provide the Rosinert, one among numerous, methods of signalling his intent. Yet, one should not (& can not) use military power to deter without a willingness & capability to employ it.

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 for instance, should tip the force  
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 impact on the Middle East. ~~They~~  
 They would never feel concerned  
 at events in small countries like  
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 neighbors. And well they may be right.

*Europe*  
- Already our commercial trade in the Pacific basin is almost equal <sup>to</sup> that in the European. Would we be willing to see minor Soviet or <sup>Chinese-</sup> ~~Soviet~~-inspired military actions chip away at our access to these markets? <sup>Perhaps a counter-coup</sup> Would the Soviets even need to use <sup>would</sup> ground military force? *in Indonesia, subversion in the Philippines*

In the Middle East ~~will~~ <sup>would</sup> we stand by Israel if her existence <sup>is</sup> threatened?

*In the Mideast does one not need to consider that*  
By 1980 perhaps 40 to 50 percent of our oil energy will be imported from the ~~Middle East~~ <sup>that area</sup>, if there are not major

changes of current policies. (and they must be changed very rapidly to affect 1980) Would we ~~be~~ <sup>tolerate</sup> willing to see Soviet

*that would*  
~~or Soviet-inspired~~ minor military actions, ~~or~~ blockades, ~~or~~ embargoes jeopardize this flow? *How much pressure do we want to be vulnerable to if we cannot prevent interference with this energy artery*

*Aren't* → There are numerous other potential situations ~~currently~~ *event today in which it is imaginable that breakdowns in* visible where world stability could be ~~upset~~ and possibly

*that*  
endanger U.S. interests. (e.g. Yugoslavia, <sup>the</sup> ~~Philippines~~, <sup>secession, Soviet-inspired</sup> ~~Cuba~~, *in the Western Hemisphere*, or even severe economic *competition with Japan in the Common Market* *After all, we* C)

*that*  
To return, <sup>to</sup> my analogy with the individual pacifist,

what I am suggesting is that somewhere between fighting

another Vietnam and defending Western Europe against a

major invasion, there may be a threshold point for U.S. *military*

involvement. How large and what kind of a military

*today*  
establishment we require <sup>is</sup> in part a function of where

our intuition tells us that threshold will lie 5-10 years

from now.

But there are risks in buying too much insurance also. The obvious one is cost - the lost opportunities to spend on other programs or to reduce taxes.

With military insurance, there ~~is~~ some also see a risk that

A { We have been talking about the tolerance level, the threshold, for actually employing military force. In practice, there likely would be more instances of relying on the existence of our forces to deter the outbreak of combat rather than actually employing them. However, one should not (and cannot) use military power to deter without a willingness and capability to employ it.

Thus, the case for having military force in the 1970's and 1980's rests on the uncertainty of events that could impact on U.S. national interests. The risk in not having enough military force available lies in the <sup>possibly</sup> sudden realization that ~~we cannot prevent interference with our interests because~~ <sup>being comforted by some</sup> ~~our forces are inadequate.~~ <sup>which is almost</sup>

- <sup>Persian Gulf</sup> Indian Ocean oil
- Fishing rights
- Mineral imports

The maintenance of military force is insurance against this. The risks and costs of maintaining military insurance <sup>are</sup> ~~is~~ several fold. <sup>too much</sup>

① ~~• That the expense will preclude other opportunities and other programs, domestic and overseas.~~

→ <sup>our</sup> That having military force will lead to its use, both because of our past habit of reliance on it, and because of pressures from within the military establishment. There is a thin barrier between brandishing a sword and striking with it.

E

I for one do not believe that ~~we~~  
this need be a <sup>major</sup> problem. We are  
by far the wealthiest nation in the world.  
We can afford what we need  
for military defense & for  
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what levels of military force we do  
what for the country. If we  
overestimate or think exclusively  
of goals that the country has  
rejected, we will not help the  
process of resolving priorities. I  
am confident, though, that

The people of our country <sup>do</sup> recognize  
~~the validity of military~~

that our responsibilities call for  
a strong military capability &  
will support guns & butter too  
in reasonable proportion.

The answer to the second  
risk that comes with military  
insurance - the unnecessary use  
of military force because  
you have it - lies in  
firm civilian command of  
all national assets - military  
& non-military. If, as some  
believe, we have ~~been~~ relied  
too heavily on military power in

the past several decades, the  
answer is to learn & better  
how to employ our economic,  
diplomatic, psychological &  
other national assets. <sup>eliminating the bass drums</sup>  
~~Premptively cutting off our~~  
~~military arm is not the way~~  
~~to achieve this.~~

~~to achieve~~  
to prevent this dominating the  
orchestra. <sup>the orchestra must play</sup> ~~the President should~~  
~~not feel himself militarily~~  
~~emasculated~~  
~~impotent~~  
~~sufficient military power to~~  
The proper orchestration



E-3

For the United States in the  
next decade may call for a  
lesser visible ~~audible~~  
military element, but let us  
not tie the President's  
hands by denying him any  
option of choice. Surely we  
can be rational enough as  
a nation not to call out  
the ~~the~~ military unnecessarily  
without eliminating our insurance  
policy entirely. There are simply  
too many uncertainties ahead.  
Within this broad framework,

*on with less in*  
The answer to the first objection ~~is~~ a judicious  
balance in ~~the~~ <sup>our</sup> allocation of resources. *(C) 1/1/78*

The answer to the second is found in the establishment  
of firm civilian command of the use of national assets.  
This includes a greater recognition and facility in handling  
the economic, diplomatic and all other facets of our national  
power.

*circulation*  
*and must use the Power*  
Naval Strategy must find you young officers in a unique  
and doubly frustrating position. The Coast Guard is an armed  
force yet works for DOT in peacetime, and for the past 8  
years in Vietnam. You are forced to act with the Navy only  
if we have messed it up. Secondly, you share the frustration  
of midshipmen at my alma mater who must watch us over-40  
oldtimers muck about selecting strategies and setting policies  
that you will be expected to fulfill.

I see the roles for both our Navy and our Coast Guard  
expanding over the next decade. As this winter's fuel crisis  
brought painfully close to home, our own nation is becoming  
increasingly reliant on overseas sources for oil. Other  
minerals essential to industry must also be imported. As the  
Soviet Navy increasingly makes its presence felt throughout  
the ocean's of the world, we must be prepared to defend this  
trade.

Beyond this, the role of  
the sea in our daily life  
is expanding exponentially.

Man will tap the <sup>economic & recreational</sup> resources of the oceans to  
a dramatic new degree  
10 years ahead. There are  
fewer laws & precedents to  
govern this development than on  
land. This is where we both  
come in, primarily you in the  
Coast Guard. Most of much of  
the responsibility for regulating,  
policing & ~~maintaining~~ ensuring the  
safety of our new reliance  
on the sea will be yours, but

always backed by the implicit  
fighting strength of our total  
naval power, the United  
States Navy & when needed  
the United States Coast Guard.  
Together we have great  
challenges ahead & great  
opportunities for service  
to our country.

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CLOSE COOPERATION - COMMON INTERESTS

PRESIDENT C.G. WAR COLLEGE

2 FACULTY & 7 STUDENTS

~~OTTO GRAHAM REVENGE~~

ONE POINT IN COMMON - PROFESSIONALISM

MANY KINDS -

VICAR MOST PROFESSIONAL

*Good Point /*  
*Speech*  
*FILE*

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(USCG ACDMY NEON 2/9/72

NOT WHOLE LOAD

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2

SEAMANSHIP

MANAGEMENT

UNDERSTANDING BASIC PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES - BEING ABLE ARTICULATE  
CONTAINMENT OUT

DETENTE HERE

VN CEASEFIRE

SALT

MBFR

PEKING MOSCOW

ECONOMICS

E/W GERMANY - N/S KOREA

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WHY NEED STRONG MILITARY -

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YOU AND ME DIFFICULT POSITION

ACCEPTED - HONORABLE - IMPORTANT - PATRIOTIC

ASSUMED STRONG MILITARY NECESSARY ELEMENT *WAY OF LIFE*

ARGUMENTS - HOW MUCH C.G. - NAVY

UNDERLYING PRESUMPTION;

MILITARY STRENGTH WAS FOUNDATION PLACE IN WORLD

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TODAY - PRESUMPTIONS NOT EXIST -

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PROFESSIONAL IN FUNCTIONS  
BURDEN YOU & ME  
(SHIP HANDLING)

4

PROFESSIONAL IN ARTICULATING

WHY OUR SERVICES NEEDED 1970's-80's

WHAT YOU'VE ~~LONG WAY OFF?~~

~~ARE YOU READY UNDERSTAND ROLE~~

JUSTIFY PROTECTIVE/HUMANITARIAN

INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT

FACE SQUARELY - INEXTRICABLY PART UNIFORMED MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

FORMERLY - MAJOR CRISIS

NOW - VN -

PERFORMANCE

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PREPARED TO DEFEND VN's - MORE LIKELY FOR C.G.



PROBABLY ARE READY - *WOULDN'T BE HERE*  
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PROBABLY AGREE EASY SEE WHY NEED MILITARY

1. CANNOT ABANDON 25 YEARS RESPONSIBILITIES
2. MIL POWER & WORLD STATUS = WANT BE WORLD POWER
3. DESPITE ENTHUSIASM - MAN

HOBBSIAN

EGOCENTRIC - SELFISH - NATURAL STATE OF CONFLICT

4. NO CHANGE SOVIET/CHINESE IDEOLOGY - WORLD REVOLUTION

VON RIBBENTROP 1939

FIND 4 POINTS PERSUASIVE WITH FRIENDS OVER 40 -

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CAN YOU USE THEM WITH GIRLS CONN COLLEGE - FRIENDS YALE?

WILL ASK:

1. WORLD CHANGED - POLICEMAN?  
COST - CUTTERS
2. AWARENESS DOMESTIC - LESS INTEREST SOLVING OTHERS
3. ARMS RACE DANGERS - SOMEONE NEEDS REVERSE
4. VIET NAM DEVISIVENESS - PROVED OUR INTERESTS DO NOT  
DEMAND SUCH SACRIFICES
5. REGARDLESS HOBBS - WAR IMMORAL

THESE KIND OPINIONS I RECEIVE FROM UNDER 40'S

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HOW RESOLVE -

DISSUADE OVER 40's

TEMPER UNDER 40's

IN BETWEEN *DIFFERENCES*

LIKENED CASE OF *DIFFERENCES* AVOWED PACIFICIST *2*

*VIOLENCE*  
EACH DENIAL DIFFERENT

1. ONLY IMMORAL WARS
2. ONLY OVERSEAS WARS
3. ONLY UNPROVOKED WARS
4. HOME SEQUESTERED
5. RAPE
6. SAVE OWN LIFE

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7. TOTAL ESCHEWAL VIOLENCE

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PACIFICIST BETWEEN EXTREMES  
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TOTAL ESCHEWAL

NAKED AGRESSION

MILITARY - *REQUIREMENT FOR US*

→ PREDOMINANT RELIANCE MILITARY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

TOTAL ISOLATIONISM / *Refusom*

BOUND END UP IN BETWEEN -

HOW DETERMINE?

START <sup>Approved For Release 2001/08/01 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500310001-3</sup>

BOUND PROBLEM - WHERE CONSENSUS WOULD EXIST

UNPROVOKED, UNAMBIGUOUS OVERT INVASION

AGREE ABSORPTION W. EUROPE INIMICAL OUR INTENTS

HOW MUCH FORCE/INSURANCE DEBATABLE

INCOME

CONDITION HOUSE

OUTLOOK

IF EUROPE ONE EXTREME - WHERE ELSE ON SCALE DO WE LOOK TO FIND A  
PLACE BETWEEN EXTREMES - BETWEEN ONLY REJECT IMMORAL WARS AND TOTAL  
ESCHEWAL OF PACIFICIST

1. SUBTLE APPROACH TO EUROPE

MILITARY ACTION - GEOGRAPHIC FLANKS

VIEW TANTAMOUNT TO INVASION

SUDETENLAND 1938

2. NAVAL POWER - IMPRESSION ISOLATE

NORWAY

YUGOSLAVIA

ICELAND

TURKEY

WILLING BUILD/DISPLAY NAVAL FORCE  
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FIN-ADDED

3. PACIFIC

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ENCIRCLEMENT CHINA

EFFECT EUROPE

BUILD/DISPLAY PACIFIC FORCE

TOO TRUCULENT 1970's-80's

4. COMMERCE PACIFIC

MINOR MILITARY ACTIONS DISRUPT

INDONESIA COUNTER-COUP

PHILIPPINES INSURRECTION

WILLING HELP EVEN MILITARY - OR LET COMMERCE EVAPORATE

5. MID EAST - ISRAEL  
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WILLING MAINTAIN FORCE

6. MID EAST OIL

40-50%

MILITARY BLOCKADES

COMMERCIAL EMBARGOES

JEOPARDIZE FLOW OIL HOMES - FACTORIES

HOW MUCH MILITARY PRESSURE WANT BE ABLE EXERT



7. OTHER POTENTIAL INSTABILITIES INVOLVING U.S. INTERESTS

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YUGOSLAV SUCCESSION

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN OUR HEMISPHERE

ECONOMIC COMPETITION

JAPAN

EEC

ARABS

SOVIET MANIPULATION

NOTE: NOT JUST QUESTION USING FORCE. DISPLAY OF FORCE FOR NATIONAL  
INFLUENCE CAN BE IMPORTANT -

JAPAN

EEC

ECONOMIC MILITARY TIES

11 CAN NON-COMBAT USE ALSO VALUABLE DETERING CONFLICTS  
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SIMPLY PRESENCE - IMPLIED CAPABILITY

PRESIDENT - SIGNAL INTENT. EVEN IF NOT VITAL TO U.S.

CAN DO LOT OF GOOD

BUT HOW FAR DO GO?

~~LIKE BALANCE OF PACIFICIST.~~

THOSE WHO ARGUE:

1. ANY BRANDISHING BAD - CAN'T DO UNLESS WILLING USE
2. SITUATIONS CITED NOT VITAL -

NOT CONCERNED BALANCE EUROPE - YUGO

NOT INTERESTED ISRAEL - KOREA - LATIN AMERICA

BUT *I SUGGEST 7* *WILL BE INVOLVED MINOR CONFLICTS 15*  
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SOMEWHERE BETWEEN ANOTHER VIET NAM AND DEFENSE W. EUROPE

WILL <sup>E</sup> THRESHOLD OF CONSENSUS

HOW LARGE -

*FORCE MAXIMUM WILL BE FUNCTION INTUITION*

WHAT KIND MILITARY FUNCTION INTENTION WHERE THRESHOLD BE 5-10 YEARS

CASE FOR MILITARY 1970's-80's -

UNCERTAINTY OF EVENTS COULD IMPACT U.S. INTERESTS -

TWO RISKS:

1. TOO LITTLE - UNABLE PREVENT INTERFERENCE OUR INTERESTS  
BECAUSE FORCES INADEQUATE
2. SPEND TOO MUCH ON INSURANCE

TOO MUCH -

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1. LOST OPPORTUNITY SPEND OTHER PROGRAMS

ANSWER JUDICIOUS BALANCE -

NOT BELIEVE PROBLEM

WEALTHIEST

CAN AFFORD - SORT PRIORITIES

WE IN UNIFORM MUST HELP

EXPLICITLY STATE WHAT CAN DO

DO NOT OVERESTIMATE

PEOPLE RECOGNIZE NEED GUNS - BUTTER AND OUR CAPABILITY

PROVIDE BOTH

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OTHER ARGUMENT ON TOO MUCH:

2. <sup>Approved For Release 2001/08/01 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500310001-3</sup> HAVING FORCE WILL LEAD TO ITS USE

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PAST HABIT - EVEN BRANDISHING - ~~THIN LINE~~  
PRESSURES OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

ANSWER

FIRM CIVILIAN CONTROL ALL NATIONAL RESOURCES - *IF USED*

*MIL 2 MUCH* LEARN HOW APPLY NON-MILITARY BETTER

BRASS DRUMS - ORCHESTRATE

PROPER ORCHESTRATION MAY BE LESS MILITARY-

DO NOT TIE PRESIDENTS HANDS - DENY OPTION

*DISC/EMPLO*

ASSUME RATIONAL ENOUGH NOT CALL OUT MILITARY UNNECESSARILY

*DEMOCRATIC*

WITHIN THIS BROAD FRAMEWORK, I SEE THE ROLES FOR BOTH OUR NAVY  
AND OUR COAST GUARD EXPANDING OVER THE NEXT DECADE. AS THIS WINTER'S  
FUEL CRISIS BROUGHT PAINFULLY CLOSE TO HOME, OUR OWN NATION IS  
BECOMING INCREASINGLY RELIANT ON OVERSEAS SOURCES FOR OIL. OTHER  
MINERALS ESSENTIAL TO INDUSTRY MUST ALSO BE IMPORTED. AS THE  
SOVIET NAVY INCREASINGLY MAKES ITS PRESENCE FELT THROUGHOUT THE  
OCEANS OF THE WORLD, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO DEFEND THIS TRADE.  
BEYOND THIS, THE ROLE OF THE SEA IN OUR DAILY LIFE IS EXPANDING  
EXPONENTIALLY. MAN WILL TAP THE MANY ECONOMIC AND RECREATIONAL  
RESOURCES OF THE OCEANS TO A DRAMATIC NEW DEGREE IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

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THERE ARE FEWER LAWS AND PRECEDENTS TO GOVERN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEAS THAN DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAND. THIS IS WHERE WE BOTH COME IN. PRIMARILY YOU, IN THE COAST GUARD. YOU RESPOND TO 40,000 CALLS FOR HELP A YEAR. SAVE 3000 LIVES AND RENDER ASSISTANCE TO SEVERAL BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF SHIPPING. MUCH OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGULATING, POLICING AND ENSURING THE SAFETY OF OUR NEW RELIANCE ON THE SEA WILL CONTINUE TO BE YOURS, BUT ALWAYS BACKED BY THE IMPLICIT FIGHTING STRENGTH OF OUR TOTAL NAVAL POWER. THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND WHEN NEEDED THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD TOGETHER WE HAVE GREAT CHALLENGES AHEAD AND GREAT OPPORTUNITIES FOR SERVICE TO OUR COUNTRY.